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abstract. Regional development planning/management responds to needs for preventing inequality among re-
gions within nations characterised by multi-culturality and variation among regions, through the planning/man-
agement of appropriate programmes and policies. This paper examines inequality in the development of two of Ni-
geria’s states in the geographical South-East and the political South-South. Among other issues, historical conflicts 
among various ethno-cultural groups constituting Nigeria and culminating in violence (e.g. the 1967–1970 civil war 
fought against the programme of Ibo (a socio-cultural group) seceding from Nigeria’s federation to found Biafra) 
are reviewed. Despite Nigeria’s tragic civil war, inequality persists. We examine inequality resulting from system-
atic implementation of policies/programmes of Nigeria’s federal government institutions that marginalise Cross 
River State. Using the methods of comparative analysis and a descriptive case study, we show the consequences of 
marginalisation policies implemented by the federal government alone or in collaboration with (i.e. in support of) 
Akwa Ibom State for the development of human capital in Cross River State. The specific acts of marginalisation 
referred to here include: the ceding of the Bakassi Peninsula – a part of Cross River State – to the Republic of Cam-
eroon in 2005, and more recently (2009) another ceding of 76 oil wells, hitherto the property of Cross River State, 
to Akwa Ibom State. We argue that, strengthened by marginalising/polarising policies (higher revenue allocation 
based on derivation principle of oil production), Akwa Ibom’s ongoing implementation of free education policy 
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promises to facilitate its achievement of millennium development goals in basic education by 2015, beyond which 
it might reach disproportionately higher levels of tertiary educational attainment by 2024 and after. By contrast, 
the contrived dwindling of oil revenue accruing to Cross River State deprives it of funding for competitive human 
capital development programme(s). We recommend that Cross River State employs serious monitoring of margin-
alising schemes against its people considering recent traumatising experience, and plan/implement human capital 
development programmes aimed to improve its competitiveness under the context of intra-regional inequality.
key words: inequality, sub-national, region, marginalisation, competitiveness, human capital, development, 
states
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1. Introduction
Within the past decade – or thereabouts – 
a myriad new development issues have aroused 
the interest of human geographers, most of whom 
undertook to devise and apply geographies of 
neoliberalism and neoliberalisation to gain an 
understanding of their intricacies. By doing so, 
those human geographers have brought about 
a rapid expansion of theoretical and conceptual 
aspects of those new sub-disciplines of human 
geography. Some of those emerging issues could 
be described as ones of upsurge in the geogra-
phies of neoliberalism and/or neoliberalisation, 
ranging “from cities to citizenship, sexuality to 
subjectivity, and development to discourse, to 
name but a few” (Springer 2012a: 135). Recently, 
the literature in the fields of spatial and/or re-
gional development planning and management 
has witnessed increasing interest of scholars in 
issues that were hitherto ignored but that bear 
relevance to national and sub-national develop-
ment outcomes. For example, in eulogising the 
benefit of trust in national development, Alex A. 
Pereira has applied the class-relations perspec-
tive to show that the dominance of the develop-
mental state involving about 40 years of steady 
economic growth in Singapore is attributable to 
the way the capitalist state has collaborated with 
trans-national capital in the absence of a domes-
tic capitalist class, thereby distinguishing this 
developmental state from its East Asian counter-
parts (Pereira 2007). It is worth recalling that Sin-
gapore – where growth has occurred – is one of 
the 12 sustainable growth economies which had 
experienced growth rates of at least seven per 
cent per year for a quarter of a century at the time 
those countries were studied (Bayer 2009: 91–92 
citing Spence 2008). The economic growth experi-
ence of other developing countries outside those 
of sustainable growth was not as good, thereby 
warranting research aimed at formulating solu-
tions to the challenges they face.
2. Conceptualising African-
Nigerian development challenges: 
From general neoliberalism/ 
neoliberalisation to marginalisation
Neoliberalism and neoliberalisation are in-
creasingly applied to conceptualise a myriad 
development challenges facing Africa, including 
Nigeria. In highlighting some national develop-
ment challenges faced by sub-Saharan countries 
in the context of neoliberal globalisation, it was 
found that Nigeria had attained high levels of 
implementation of neoliberal policies by the mid-
1980s (Ingwe et al. 2010) and perhaps onwards. 
Although regional investments in education (es-
pecially the funding of education programmes 
and establishment of institutions, among oth-
ers) as instruments catalysing economic growth 
by increasing human capital, productivity and 
competitiveness at the sub-national region-
al level have been explored (Ingwe et al. 2011), 
the role of neoliberalism in the process is yet to 
receive scholarly attention. We shift emphasis 
from general aspects of neoliberalism and neolib-
eralisation to their more specific characteristics 
(marginalisation) because the latter have been 
fairly well examined in our previous works that 
acknowledge and implicate the force of neoliber-
alism and neoliberalisation in their expansion or 
development.
Brought to you by | Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza
Authenticated | 150.254.124.160
Download Date | 7/24/13 9:54 AM
 FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING, MARGINALISATION AND SUB-NATIONAL INTER-REGIONAL INEQUALITY... 53
Among the many development issues in Ni-
geria we have studied in terms of theoretical 
conceptualisations founded on neoliberalism is 
an outline of a global research agenda examining 
a myriad themes emphasised by Nigeria’s suc-
cessive heads of states and federal government 
administrations. With the baseline of study fixed 
at 1960 – the year Nigeria was granted political 
independence by British colonialists but devoid 
of substantial social and economic freedom – we 
attempted to trace the implementation of policies 
of a neoliberal kind from then up to the end of 
the third term of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 2007 
(Ingwe et al. 2012). Other studies have justified or 
explained the federal government’s intervention 
in the Hausa-Fulani socio-cultural education (Al-
majiri) system in northern Nigeria (Ingwe 2013a), 
sustainable energy implementation in urban Ni-
geria (Ingwe et al. 2009), an equivocal response 
of Nigeria’s federal parliament to the independ-
ent management of the economy by the country’s 
Central Bank (Ingwe 2013b), and governance 
deficits that seem to catalyse the nationalisation 
of sub-national rebellions in Nigeria. An example 
of the last process was the January 2012 rebellion 
against oil subsidy removal that provoked the 
emergence of nation-wide revolutionary forces 
(Ingwe 2013c). In all of the studies listed above, 
marginalisation – one of the dimensions of neo-
liberalism and neoliberalisation – has never been 
used as a concept to understand how specific 
sub-national regions or socio-cultural groups get 
into intense suppression through deliberate poli-
cy making and implementation.
To conceptualise marginalisation as one vari-
ety of neoliberalism, our point of departure is the 
claim by a human geographer, Simon Springer, 
about the coalescence of neoliberalism with vi-
olence in a fluid process wherein the resulting 
hegemony of neoliberalism exhibits abuse and 
widespread banishment of ‘Others’ almost per-
petually in the many areas undergoing neoliber-
alisation. He argues that “the widespread banish-
ment of ‘Others’ under neoliberalism produces 
a ‘state of exception’, wherein, because of its in-
herently dialectic nature, exceptional violence is 
transformed into exemplary violence”. Springer 
claims that this transformation occurs as aver-
sion for alterity intensifies – a phenomenon that 
becomes the rule and undergoes intensification 
under neoliberalism (Springer 2012b: 136). This 
process is conceived in the present article as 
a spectrum in the intensification of violence with-
in which marginalisation constitutes one of the 
many bands.
The focus of this article on aspects of limited 
trust in the latter situation (Nigeria) is purpose-
ful: this is where the implementation of policies 
promoting justice, equality, and fairness among 
regions constituting a nation are most required, 
vital as they are to promoting much-needed na-
tion-building and sustainable regional develop-
ment. The requirements for the foregoing con-
ditions prompt increasing advocacy of creating 
peaceful and harmonious structures, processes, 
institutions, and attitudes within nations, espe-
cially in states whose multi-cultural characteris-
tics pose challenges to harmonious co-existence. 
Unequal opportunities for the development of 
one or more regions, areas, communities, eth-
no-cultural groups in a heterogeneous human 
population have been recognised as one of the 
challenges that face most national development 
managements.
Nigeria’s post-independent socio-political 
history is tainted by the so-called civil war waged 
for 30 months, from 1967 to 1970, by armed forces 
of what came to be known as the federal govern-
ment side, comprising two major sub-national 
regions (West and North), against the third re-
gion (East). It was a response to the declaration 
of independence, i.e. secession from the Nige-
rian Federation founded only seven years after 
independence (1960), by the Eastern Region un-
der the governorship of Major Emeka Odumeg-
wu Ojukwu, with a substantial proportion of its 
population deriving from the Ibo socio-cultural 
group, who charged that the federal government 
implemented policies that marginalised them. 
Although this rebellion is the one best known, it 
was crushed like the pioneering rebellion against 
the federal government breaking out under the 
auspices of the (Niger) Delta Volunteer Service 
(DVS) in 1966. This rebellion involved the mobi-
lisation of dissenting people of the Niger Delta, 
especially those from the old River State com-
prising the current River and Bayelsa under the 
leadership of Isaac Adaka Boro (Osaghae et al. 
2007). Despite the recurrent rebellions waged 
since independence by various groups of civil 
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society to gain attention and receive favourable 
policies from the Nigerian Federation, evidence 
shows that the policies currently implemented by 
the federal government of Nigeria have retained 
the characteristics of marginalisation perceived 
by the socio-cultural minority groups of the old 
River State and the Ibos of the South-Eastern Re-
gion shortly after independence in 1960.
Owing to the serious consequences of con-
trived or naturally occurring circumstances that 
create inequality in the development of some re-
gions within one nation, governments of some 
countries which have experienced agitations 
(sometimes violent) from particular human 
groups perceiving their region to be treated un-
justly or marginalised, have sought to undertake 
development planning strategies which deliber-
ately strive to equalise, as much as possible, the 
opportunities, chances and resources that can 
engender equality in the development of regions 
that constitute the nation. Some known charges 
of marginalisation at the global level have been 
reported in the literature. Perhaps the best known 
example of this form of racist or discriminatory 
human relations popularly called anti-Semitism 
in Europe involves the Jews, who have long 
charged the Nazis of marginalisation.
In the United States of America, Afri-
can-Americans and American Indians, or Native 
Americans, have charged the US government 
and its top functionaries with applying a rule of 
marginalisation that historically has led to the 
destruction of their people. In Australia, the Abo-
rigines have complained against marginalisation. 
The Berbers’ charge of marginalisation against 
their people seems to be one of the best known 
(Igwe 2005).
Whether real or imagined, marginalisation 
presents a useful approach towards understand-
ing the degree of harmony or disharmony within 
a particular nation. That is, it offers a framework 
for assessing the way its government guarantees 
or sustains social order necessary for national 
economic growth and development. This article 
examines a recent move towards marginalisa-
tion of Cross River State since March 2009 and 
the possible consequences of such policies. It 
involves the seizure by federal agencies of the 
state’s 76 petroleum oil wells and handing them 
over to Akwa Ibom State leading to the striking of 
Cross River State from the list of Nigeria’s littoral 
states receiving special allocations based on the 
principle of derivation of national revenue from 
particular parts of the country. The action has led 
to a drastic reduction in the income of Cross Riv-
er State, thereby hampering its development pro-
grammes, including human capital development 
programmes such as education and health care.
In this article we describe the marginalising 
policies implemented by the Nigerian federal 
government through its agencies and how this 
results in a discrimination against one of the fed-
eration’s constituent sub-national regions (states) 
while benefiting another. We focus on one aspect 
of the marginalisation policies, namely the une-
qual sharing of financial resources collected into 
a common pool and managed by the federal gov-
ernment. In order to demonstrate the virulence of 
marginalisation by federal agencies, we decided 
to examine the manifestation of this problem in 
two of Nigeria’s 36 states (Akwa Ibom and Cross 
River) that previously shared common geograph-
ical boundaries, socio-political histories and in-
stitutions within the South-South geopolitical 
region (formerly the South-Eastern geographical 
zone). Specifically, we show how declining feder-
al revenue going to Cross River State and increas-
ing revenue allocated to its neighbour, Akwa 
Ibom, threatens to hamper the former’s human 
capital development while the latter progresses 
apace. National and regional newspapers as well 
as Cross River radio news, commentaries and ad-
vertorials reported around June 2009 that before 
Cross River State’s 76 oil wells had been seized 
in mid–2009, Akwa Ibom State had sufficient 
means to fund its free education programme at 
all levels of the education system. This was made 
possible by its receipt of a larger revenue alloca-
tion (14 billion naira1 monthly) than Cross River 
State’s ₦1.5 billion, after the seizure of the 13% 
derivation fund to the state resulting from unjust 
decisions of Nigeria’s National Boundary Com-
mission (NBC) and the Revenue Mobilisation 
and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) via a letter is-
sued by the NBC on 4 January 2009 (Adekeye et 
al. 2009: 38).
1 The exchange rate of US $1 was ₦155.23 as of 25 Janu-
ary 2013.
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3. Marginalising as a means to achieve 
political hegemony in Nigeria
Irrespective of the role played by peace, uni-
ty and social order in facilitating national eco-
nomic growth and development through social 
capital, mutual trust and harmony that they in-
culcate into various groups which form the na-
tion, the successive governments of the Nigerian 
Federation seem either to have been ignorant of 
its relevance or to have downplayed it, or mis-
understood its distinctive significance. The mar-
ginalising disposition of Nigeria’s federal gov-
ernment is easily understood in the light of the 
following brief political history of the country. 
The present Nigerian federation is the creation of 
British colonialists. The colonial era involved the 
amalgamation in 1914 of two major socio-cultur-
al human groups broadly described as the North-
ern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria by Sir 
Frederick Lugard, who then served the British 
Empire as Governor-General of Nigeria. A point 
that has been ignored in most contributions to 
the literature is that the two protectorates com-
prised multiple autonomous ethnic nationalities 
forcefully coalesced into a monolithic entity by 
the British colonial machinery.
At this juncture it is worth noting the failure 
of this coercive colonial action to forge a union 
between the protectorates and their constituent 
ethnic nationalities as well as its failure to re-
spect the views and integrities of their political 
leaders during the process and in the subsequent 
power shift from the British colonialists to the in-
digenous élite. The massive plunder of Nigeria’s 
human and natural resources by the British colo-
nialists led to strong agitation for independence, 
including socio-economic and political freedoms. 
Regrettably, the brand of independence achieved 
on 1 October 1960 was a merely political or flag 
type. This derogatory description is a reflection 
of the serious and prolonged or chronic poverty 
afflicting a disproportionately large segment of 
Nigeria’s population. Despite the recent claims of 
high economic growth rates of about six percent, 
serious poverty – in 1997 an estimated 70.2 and 
90.8 percent of Nigerians lived on less than US 
$1 and US $2 per day, respectively (WRI, UNDP, 
UNEP & World Bank, 2005) – is yet to be reduced. 
Therefore, a majority of poor Nigerians are also 
affected by inequality, injustice and deprivation. 
Some people argue that this political dynamics 
represents a mere shift of power from British co-
lonialists to a corrupt, parasitic indigenous élite, 
unrelenting in depriving Nigerians of their de-
sired socio-economic freedoms. This seems to be 
especially the views expressed by excluded Ni-
gerians from cultural groups perceived or treated 
as minorities, but sometimes also by large popu-
lations of the poor in the majority ethnic groups.
Since the view of progressive Nigerians that 
“Only a good government can stop corruption” 
is yet to be translated into reality given the ram-
part and thriving corruption perpetrated by the 
country’s élite, the poor and unfairly treated pop-
ulation strata have resorted to frequent charges 
of corruption based on socio-cultural platforms 
cutting across the entire spectrum of the country.
The disregard of British colonialists for the 
existing political leaders of the various ethnic 
nationalities that were forcefully coalesced into 
the protectorates to fabricate Nigeria requires 
mention at this juncture to consider the effective-
ness of government. Note that the handover of 
political power by the British to the indigenous 
élite happened in ways resembling the methods 
of colonialism itself: without the participation of 
the existing political leadership of ethnic nation-
alities. This point is acknowledged as the parallel 
occurrence of two governments, namely mod-
ern and traditional. The latter is synonymous 
with political leadership of ethnic nationalities 
at various levels, while the former represents in-
digenous rulers or successors of colonialists. The 
indigenous élite’s failure to use the power they 
inherited to mobilise and galvanise support from 
the existing political leaders, perhaps in their 
preoccupation with or concentration on corrup-
tion and primitive capital accumulation, has re-
sulted in serious discontentment with their bad 
government. However, traditional ruling institu-
tions of northern Nigeria were secretly involved 
in the shift of power from colonialists to indi-
genous educated élites, unlike in southern Nige-
ria. It has been suggested that this British action 
aimed to achieve their socio-economic and polit-
ical interests by their preference to assist North-
ern Nigerians to maintain hegemony over their 
Southern counterparts. Therefore, while North-
ern Nigerians – both the military and civilians – 
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dominated the federal government from 1960 to 
1999 and also from 2007 to 2011, the ascendance 
of Southern Nigerians to the top echelons of the 
federal government resulted only from tumultu-
ous socio-political and economic circumstances 
capable of fragmenting the country. This, howev-
er, is outside the scope of the present article. The 
foregoing explains the rampart marginalisation 
charges against the federal government of Nige-
ria as dominated by Northern Nigerians.
Among the various groups that have charged 
the federal government of Nigeria with margin-
alisation are the Ibos of south-eastern Nigeria, 
whose quarrels with the federal government 
during the First Republic (1960–1967), still per-
sisting, culminated then in ethnic hostilities and 
a 30-month civil war (1967–1970). Others have in-
cluded the agitation by the people of the oil-rich 
Niger Delta region (from the western Benin River 
to the Imo River) against the unjust exploitation 
of their fossils (oil and natural gas) since their ex-
traction started in the late 1950s; a charge by the 
Hausa-Fulani people of northern Nigeria against 
the Obasanjo administration (1999–2007); and the 
agitation by the Yoruba people of south-west-
ern Nigeria against what they perceived as eth-
nic-cleansing policy against them by the dictator-
ship of General Sani Abacha (1993–1997), among 
other less obvious or publicised cases.
Despite the rather high frequency and re-
currence of marginalisation charges in Nigeria, 
their documentation has lagged behind their se-
riousness. National development planning and 
management in Nigeria has consequently been 
hampered by the inadequacy of information and 
knowledge which ought to have been provided to 
found the practice of development management 
in the country (represented by a socio-cultural 
group called Ohanaeze). Perhaps most explicit 
was the submission by the Ibos, in October 1999, 
of the documentation of human rights violations 
and injustices done against them by the Nigerian 
Federation and a request for reparations during 
the Human Rights Violations Investigating Com-
mittee (a.k.a. the Justice Oputa Panel, named after 
the chairman of the Committee, a retired justice 
of Nigeria’s Supreme Court, Chukwudi Opu-
ta). This document highlighted sufferings of the 
Ibos, including the bloodshed of 1966 killings of 
General Aguiyi Ironsi and other prominent Ibos 
as a revenge for acts believed to have been per-
petrated by Ibos which led to the Biafra-Nigeria 
civil war (1967–1970). The request for reparation 
of $100 billion included in the document was crit-
icised, while opponents of the request preferred 
a request or proposal for the prevention of a sim-
ilar event in the future (Igwe 2005). The reasons 
for the Biafra-Nigeria civil war included quarrels 
over shares of national resources allocated on the 
basis of the population size of the constituent eth-
nic groups. Akam (2007/8) showed that there was 
a politically contrived manipulation of headcount 
in Nigeria to favour the Hausa-Fulani as the most 
populous ethnic group. To achieve this, the popu-
lation of Ibos, which was the largest, at 3,930,509, 
i.e., 36.7% of the total (10,718,920) in the 1921 cen-
sus, had been systematically reduced thereafter to 
only 3,184,585 in the 1931 census, and to 12,399,462 
(22.3%), or the third largest of the total (55,670,052) 
in the controversial and disputed 1963 census as 
well as the 1991 one (Akam 2007/8: 26–27).
4. Objectives
The general objective of this article is to high-
light the destructive regional inequality arising 
from marginalising policies of Nigeria’s federal 
government agencies working in collaboration 
with one of the six states in the South-South re-
gion (Akwa Ibom) against its neighbour (Cross 
River). The specific objective is to show how 
ongoing and recent marginalisation in the form 
of inequitable/unjust allocation of shares of 
earnings from the export of crude oil extracted 
from Cross River State’s offshore territory could 
exacerbate inequality in the region’s education-
al fortunes in the near to long-term future of the 
South-South region of Nigeria.
5. Organisation of the paper
The rest of this paper is organised in various sec-
tions. In the next, we present the context (socio-de-
mographic, geographical, economic, and political) 
of the study areas exhibiting increasing inequality 
between the two states examined, which were orig-
inally one political entity named the South-Eastern 
State, later renamed (old) Cross River State, before 
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a new state (Akwa Ibom) was created out of it, there-
by leaving in existence the new Cross River State. 
Then we bring theoretical perspectives of marginal-
isation into the discourse of inequality in the study 
areas as a way of contributing to the understand-
ing of inequality afflicting the rest of socio-cultur-
al groups marginalised in Nigeria’s South-South 
region and elsewhere in the country. Considering 
the diversity of new issues brought into the dis-
course on the geographies of neoliberalism and 
neoliberalisation, we seek to place the discourse on 
marginalisation, using references to selected the-
oretical literature, as one of its new and widening 
sub-fields or aspects. We follow on by showing the 
relationships between human capital and regional 
development outcomes at global and local (sub)
national scales, and the way ethnic crises influence, 
affect and determine national development in Ni-
geria. Afterwards, we describe the methods, data 
and sources of data used in the study. The next 
section presents our findings, including recent de-
velopment circumstances of Cross River and Akwa 
Ibom States that provide grounds for the consoli-
dation of inequality in human capital development 
resulting from increasing oil-windfall (financial 
resources allocated from the federal government 
pool) to Akwa Ibom State, compared against Cross 
River State’s declining oil revenue and education 
policy. Then we draw on extant literature to con-
firm inequality and variability in educational at-
tainments in Nigeria by sub-national regions since 
the colonial and post-colonial eras, and specifically 
draw from recent reports/analyses informing that 
the leading position of the Yoruba (a south-west-
ern Nigerian cultural group) is attributable to the 
free education policy implemented by the region’s 
former governor – the Premier and political leader 
from the 1950s until the present. Then we comment 
on how Cross River State’s recent dwindling rev-
enue is attributable to marginalisation by agencies 
and departments of Nigeria’s federal government. 
Finally, we conclude the paper and recommend 
a policy for improvement.
6. Growing inter-/intra sub-regional 
inequality
The visibility of growing inequality between 
the two states – Cross River and Akwa Ibom – is 
enhanced by reflecting on their shared geo-po-
litical history and homogeneity. They existed 
originally as one of Nigeria’s 12 states under the 
name of the South-Eastern State since its creation 
in May 1967 and continued functioning so until 
1st September 1987 when Akwa Ibom State was 
carved out of it as a separate entity. This polit-
ical action by Ibrahim B. Babangida, one of Ni-
geria’s many dictators (1985–1993), further di-
verted attention from the need to accord equal 
recognition to all of Nigeria’s old provinces, 
most of which were turned into some of Nige-
ria’s 36 states during successive acts of creating 
states and Local Government Areas. The old 
Ogoja province is one of those old provinces of 
the 1950s that were neglected as partners and co-
alesced to form the old Cross River State. It was 
this form and name that General Muritala R. Mu-
hammad, another dictator, picked upon during 
Nigeria’s second state-creation exercise in 1975 
and merely imposed a nomenclatural change 
(from South-Eastern State to Cross River State) 
rather than applying territorial re-organisation 
by way of state creation that the more political-
ly savvy representatives of ethnic nationalities 
used in order to get larger shares of the ‘national 
cake’ – a common description of the sharing of 
income derived from petroleum oil sales. Thus, 
the old Ogoja province remains one of the most 
seriously marginalised, under-developed and ex-
cluded when compared with other former prov-
inces of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, the renaming 
of the state in the mid–1970s merely recognised 
the Cross River, a river originating in the Cam-
eroon mountains, draining into Nigeria through 
the state’s north-central parts in complex mean-
ders before emptying into the southern Atlantic 
Ocean (Ojo & Adebayo 2008, Alapiki 2005).
With an area of 6,900 km2, Akwa Ibom State 
is only 31.7% of the area of Cross River State 
(21,787 km2; National Bureau of Statistics, NBS, 
2006). Although Nigeria’s ethnic groups have not 
been rigorously ranked in terms of their popula-
tion sizes, the haphazard claims about the prom-
inence of some of them place the Ibibio, Annang 
and Efik cultural groups ahead of the multiplic-
ity of cultural groups (Ekori, Bette, Bekwara, 
Ejagham, among others) constituting Cross River 
State. The state is described by most documents 
that attempt to represent it graphically as hav-
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ing an ocean/sea-ward boundary in its southern 
extreme (Cross River State, n.d.: 2, 4). Moreover, 
Cross River State possesses one of Nigeria’s larg-
est sea-ports (the third largest) on which the pi-
oneering Export Processing Zone and later Free 
Trade Zone was established by the Babangida 
dictatorship from the Calabar sea port, which 
had earlier been commissioned on 9th June 1979. 
The Calabar sea port’s compulsory pilotage area 
(described as District A) is demarcated by the 
following coordinates: latitude: 04°01’.6N; lon-
gitude: 007°24’.4E; latitude: 04°30’.3N and lon-
gitude: 008°24’.E (Cross River State, n.d.: 20–21). 
The judgement of the World Court in The Hague 
in the Netherlands in the late 2000s ceded some 
of Nigeria’s territory around a part of Cross Riv-
er State called Bakassi to the Cameroon Republic, 
causing the state to lose parts of Bakassi. Bakassi 
has been part of the Calabar area of the Efik king-
dom led from historical to the current adminis-
trations by a monarch, Obong (King) of Calabar. 
Therefore, the area of the state declined from 
23,000 km2 in 2005 to 21,787 after the hasty judge-
ment (Cross River State Planning Commission 
2005: 30, National Bureau of Statistics 2006: 2).
Like Cross River State, Akwa Ibom State also 
has an ocean-ward boundary at its southern ex-
treme. Therefore, the two states have been treat-
ed as littoral states and by that virtue have been 
getting shares of the earnings from the export 
of crude petroleum oil extracted from Nigeria’s 
offshore territory since this principle of revenue 
sharing came into force (around the 2000s).
6.1. Population
The population of Cross River State in 2006 
was 2.9 million, an increase from 1991 with its 1.9 
million (National Bureau of Statistics 2007, Na-
tional Population Commission 1991). The popu-
lation of Akwa Ibom State rose to 3.9 million in 
2006 from its 1991 population of 2.41 million (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics 2007).
6.2. Economy
Official information puts both states as being 
among the 11 southern Nigerian states which had 
poverty rates higher than the national average 
in the mid–2000s (National Bureau of Statistics 
2005: 28). In 1996 and 2004 the poverty incidence 
in the entire country were 65.6% and 54.4%, re-
spectively, as against 65.5% and 71.73% in Akwa 
Ibom State and 66.9% and 41.61% in Cross Riv-
er State (National Bureau of Statistics 2005: 69). 
Agricultural and non-agricultural occupations 
were, respectively, 21.24% and 78.76% in Akwa 
Ibom State and 29.97% and 70.03% in Cross River 
State, as against 21.54% and 78.46% for Nigeria 
(National Bureau of Statistics 2005: 76).
Since the non-agricultural occupations collec-
tively represent a wide range of occupations, the 
above figures confirm the claim that agriculture 
is the largest employer of the population of both 
states. This was also the case when the two states 
were one Cross River State, with the proportions 
of the population in agriculture and non-agricul-
tural activities in the South-South zone including 
Akwa Ibom and Cross River States being 20.90% 
and 79.10%, respectively. The relative poverty 
rates were 25.15% as “core poor”, 37.45% “mod-
erately poor” and 37.40% “non-poor” for those 
in agricultural occupations (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2005: 45-46).
6.3. Linking marginalisation theory 
to inequality between Akwa Ibom 
and Cross River States
The concept of marginalisation has been used 
to refer to the act of exclusion of some people 
from important processes and aspects of nation-
al life in ways that result in the stultification of 
the victims of the act in terms of socio-economic 
and political growth and advancement. It is un-
dertaken in several ways, including the keeping 
of its victims at the periphery of national life and 
its processes. It could take the form of presenting 
them as people who constitute threats to national 
and society’s security as an excuse for perpetrat-
ing acts of exclusion against them, e.g. keeping 
them out of appointments into positions admit-
ting them into the élite or top functionaries of the 
government or administration. It also manifests 
itself in the form of deliberate misapplication of 
public institutions in ways that can hamper the 
progress of the victims, conducting a campaign 
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of calumny or misrepresentation of the victim-
ised group, and matching such campaigns with 
complementary legal provisions. These include 
constitutional instruments such as laws and legal 
provisions designed to legitimise marginalisa-
tion perpetrated against the victims.
The concept is mild, rather polite, and implies 
a less rancorous nature of protests against the op-
pression practised by the ruling class or group. 
Therefore, the prospective élite who employs the 
concept proceeds in a way that seeks to sustain 
the relationship with the status quo rather than 
breaking it by means of bloodshed. The fact that 
it is more easily resolved through the use of bold 
administrative and political measures distin-
guishes it from other injustices, which because 
of their deeper roots require constitutional re-
forms, amendments, and even revolutions to re-
solve. The potential of marginalisation to destroy 
its victims is enormous. Although it is usually 
not written into legal documents and statutes of 
a country in which it is practised, it is inflicted on 
Fig. 1. South-South/Eastern Nigeria, including Akwa Ibom and Cross River States.
Source: Africa with Nigeria inset retrieved 25 January 2013 from http://www.worldofcultures.org/ 1024/ africa/ AfricaMaps/nigeria.gif; 
Nigeria with States and FCT retrieved 25 January 2013 from http://mapsof.net/ nigeriaciting www.world-geographics.com; Ingwe (2012).
Brought to you by | Uniwersytet im. A. Mickiewicza
Authenticated | 150.254.124.160
Download Date | 7/24/13 9:54 AM
60 RICHARD INGWE, JOSEPH K. UKWAYI, EDWARD U. UTAM
its victims in various ways. These include mass 
mobilisation and a systematic creation of a bias 
against its victims as well as the execution of 
a long-term campaign against those victims, in-
cluding the trivialisation of their problems and 
their protests.
These insidious characteristics of marginali-
sation have been observed in most parts of the 
world, including the Niger Delta, a region in-
habited by several ethnic nationalities (Ijaw, also 
known as Izon, Ogoni, Efik-Ibibio, Urhobo, and 
Itsekiri, among others) in Nigeria’s South-South 
region. This affliction occurs in the neighbouring 
south-eastern part of the country, especially the 
settlements of the Ibo socio-cultural group that 
excludes the Yoruba, while other socio-cultural 
minorities are spared this maltreatment. Margin-
alisation might also manifest itself in the form of 
the downplaying of the existence of some peo-
ple as non-existing minorities, as in the cases of 
those of northern Nigeria under the shadow of 
the Hausa-Fulani, who are presented as domi-
nant. The northern minorities include: Tiv, Iga-
la, Idoma-Gbayi, Ebira, Nupe, Southern Zaria, 
Angas, and Jukuns, among others. Elsewhere in 
Africa, marginalisation has been reported in sev-
eral places, e.g. in Rwanda and Burundi, where 
the majority Hutu people charge the Tutsi with 
marginalisation. The creation of a just, democrat-
ic leadership and good governance favourably 
disposed to the institutionalisation of policies of 
fairness, justice and the rule of the law, as well 
as the execution of development policies that 
engender equality among the various regions, 
classes of citizens and groups, have been suggest-
ed as antidotes or solutions to charges of margin-
alisation (Igwe 2005: 250–251). The democratic 
systems in Africa are fragile and susceptible to 
ethnic-based violence. For example, there are de-
bates about the violence arising from the post–27 
December 2007 elections in Kenya involving eth-
nically based killings, demonstrations, and trial 
of suspected sponsors at the International Crimi-
nal Court thereafter. Previously and immediately 
after the violence, it prompted the modification 
of the government led by Mwai Kibaki into one 
of national unity that co-opted Raila Odinga of 
the Rainbow Coalition, reflecting charges of mar-
ginalisation by some ethnic groups (the Kikuyu 
of Kenya) over a long time since the political re-
gimes of the late Jomo Kenyatta since the coun-
try’s independence (Markussen & Mbuvi 2011, 
Murunga 2011).
7. Human capital policies and regional 
development outcomes
The concept of human capital development 
has gained ascendancy in the policy sphere of 
most development-planning agencies of several 
countries due to the discovery that it contributes 
much more to national development outcomes 
than physical infrastructure. Recent estimates 
put the contribution to national wealth of human 
capital-related variables (describing the stock of 
education, training, skills and health acquired by 
people) at about 75%, as against a mere 15% con-
tributed by the stock of physical capital, includ-
ing minerals and natural resources. Owing to this 
knowledge, some scholars have undertaken anal-
yses of the ways nations and regions invest in the 
development of human capital as compared with 
physical capital, in Nigeria and elsewhere (The 
National Scholar 2002: 1, citing Andy Rosenfield). 
They have documented increasing attention that 
various national governments have concentrated 
upon education, or more precisely, their invest-
ment in this sector. For example, Frank Webster 
regards education as a legitimate foundation for 
building a ‘weightless economy’ (i.e. the new 
information economy). He justifies this asser-
tion by the fact that education is a source of new 
technologies, processes and innovations capable 
of causing an increase in wealth by boosting pro-
ductivity and generating business. It is a source 
of ‘knowledge workers’, i.e. a particular kind of 
human capital in the information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT) sector, which has been 
credited with engendering spectacular growth 
in productivity in the USA and other advanced 
countries for over a decade since information 
technology was invented and became widely ap-
plied. In the contemporary world characterised 
by rapid obsolescence of specific skills, some 
central capabilities have been identified, includ-
ing such human-capital traits as analytical skills, 
communicative effectiveness, strategic thinking, 
team work and leadership, which add to an indi-
vidual’s ability to assume responsibility for his/
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her own career path (Reich 1991, cited in Webster 
2001: 132–133). The distinctive recognition of the 
value of education by a national leader is credited 
to the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
who during his government was asked to com-
ment on his position on the high point of national 
development. His famous response was the lita-
ny: “education, education, education” (Webster 
2001: 133). The way European cities have success-
fully implemented spectacular ICT programmes 
as a means of re-inventing individual local urban 
economies to increase their competitiveness and 
productivity brilliantly illustrates the potency of 
sub-national regional development in the era of 
post-Fordism.
7.1. Injustice, inequality and ethnic crisis in 
Nigeria’s development: past and present
The authors of the articles contributing to Re-
construction and development in Nigeria (Ayida & 
Onitiri 1971) after the 1967–1970 civil war by and 
large downplayed the strong ethnic rivalries that 
provoked the 31-month military campaign by 
Biafra (the national platform of the Ibo socio-cul-
tural group) to secede from the Nigerian federa-
tion, which they perceived as unjust. However, 
Onitiri’s introduction acknowledges that the war 
resulted from over “three years of recurring po-
litical crises”. Successive statements of Nigeria’s 
development objectives in national development 
plans which followed the war pretended to rec-
ognise the serious ethnic rivalry that caused the 
war. For example, four development objectives 
proposed by Ayida (1971: 17–18) deserve quoting 
in extenso here due to their relevance to this arti-
cle because they were directed at Nigeria’s future 
(i.e. the 1970s, the period that followed the war of 
ethnic rivalry and quarrels or crises):
”... first, the rehabilitation of the war-dam-
aged areas of the country and the reconstruction 
of the economy as a whole in order to correct the 
generally accepted weaknesses of past (economic 
development) and present (war-time financial) 
policies;
Fifth, the maintenance, as far as possible, of 
a balanced development of the national economy 
by concentrating on growth points and produc-
tive capacities rather than, but not to the exclu-
sion of, the provision of subsidized social ser-
vices in the economically backward areas of the 
country;
Sixth, the production of high-level and in-
termediate Nigerian manpower to satisfy the 
requirements of the public and private sectors, 
including the replacement of the build of the ex-
patriate personnel in industry and commerce by 
1980; this could imply, for example, the produc-
tion by 1980 of a cumulative total of about 55,000 
Nigerian university graduates, mainly from insti-
tutions of higher learning in the country; and
Seventh, the provision and maintenance of 
a satisfactory level of social services which the 
economy and the people can bear at any given 
time”.
In proposing prospects for effective devel-
opment planning machinery for Nigeria many 
decades ago, one of Nigeria’s development plan-
ners, Eniola O. Adeniyi (1980) drew attention 
to some pertinent factual issues. He states that: 
“In a federation as we have in Nigeria, processes 
which bring about dynamic equilibrium between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces are always 
at work. Adjustments are continuously being 
made in the relationship between the federal and 
state governments which are in the direction of 
further economic integration in the country. Ni-
geria of the 1980s, unlike in the First Republic 
(1960–1967), cannot be said to desire union but 
purposeful unity to her economic and social rela-
tionships” (1980: 294–295).
8. Methods and data
We used the methods of comparison, descrip-
tion, and case study to show various regional 
development scenarios in Akwa Ibom and Cross 
River States. As documented in the literature, the 
method of comparison (Scott & Marshall 2005) 
enabled us to highlight differences in education 
development scenarios of the two states using 
available indicators. Several methodologists have 
demonstrated the appropriateness of description 
as a veritable method for achieving the objectives 
that have previously received scant attention by 
academic researchers (e.g. Ogunniyi 1992, Isan-
gedighi et al. 2004). Our objective (of highlighting 
inter-/intra-regional inequity involving a com-
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parison of regional development scenarios in 
Akwa Ibom and Cross River States) has, by and 
large, been ignored by researchers. Instead of un-
dertaking sophisticated data analysis, we rapidly 
compared and aggregated education-related in-
dicators of both states, using data provided by 
the Federal Ministry of Education and the Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics to highlight variations 
in the recent education scenarios (performance), 
thereby pointing towards future scenarios for the 
education sectors of the studied states.
We extracted and used data/information on 
relevant variables and attributes from secondary 
sources. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
Nigeria’s official agency responsible for provid-
ing statistics for development planning and man-
agement, provides reliable data on education and 
many other sectors of development on a national 
basis. The data are generated by the collabora-
tion between the NBS, the World Bank and oth-
er stakeholders to create statistics on poverty and 
poverty-monitoring initiatives. The latter, which 
include data on poverty and well-being, among 
other related conditions, were derived from two 
data generation exercises undertaken by the NBS: 
the 2006 Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire 
(CWIQ) and the 2007 Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Survey (MICS). These pertain to the education sec-
tors of the 36 states and the capital (Abuja) from 
which data covering the two study areas (Cross 
River and Akwa Ibom States) and their wider 
geopolitical (South-South) region were extracted 
for analysis. The reliability of the NBS data arises 
from its partnership with the Federal Ministry of 
Education, which has been using the Internation-
al Standard Industrial Classification on Education 
(ISICE) since 1978 to generate education data. 
Additionally, it employs trained teachers to take 
censuses whereby data on 53 attributes of primary 
and secondary levels of education, including those 
of interest to this study, are collected on the annu-
al Education Statistics Day, which falls on the last 
Wednesday of March every year (National Bureau 
of Statistics 2007: 945-999). Although we stress the 
future human capital development scenarios of 
the two states studied, we included other related 
regional development indicators of the states. Our 
analysis involved the use of a combination of sim-
ple quantitative and qualitative techniques of data 
processing.
9. Findings
9.1. Educational characteristics of Cross River 
and Akwa Ibom States
In what follows, we present educational char-
acteristics indicating inequality in this respect be-
tween the two states. Table 1 reveals that here Cross 
River State – the older region – is either lagging be-
hind or out-competed by its younger neighbour, 
Akwa Ibom State. That is, the latter performed bet-
ter in most aspects of the education sector.
Cross River State’s educational backwardness 
predates the above more recent statistics on edu-
cation. It is believed that while the people of Akwa 
Ibom State were still part of the old Cross River 
State, the unwritten policy of marginalisation 
was practised systematically to ensure that Akwa 
Ibom people got greater educational opportuni-
ties than Cross River people. The consequence is 
that while the Cross River State government and 
other institutions of the federal government of Ni-
geria regard it as ‘educationally disadvantaged’, 
Akwa Ibom State is not described in such terms. 
Rather, it is reputed to possess a great number of 
good-quality human capital, including university 
professors, other highly educated people in the 
professions, and so forth. Federal government 
institutions, including the Joint Admissions and 
Matriculations Board, the agency mandated to 
process the admission of candidates into tertiary 
educational institutions in Nigeria, have officially 
recognised the degree of ‘educational disadvan-
tage’ of Cross River State. This suggests that Nige-
ria’s Federal Ministry of Education, among other 
institutions, recognises this tragic circumstance of 
Cross River State.
9.2. Future scenarios of educational 
and human capital attainments 
in Cross River and Akwa Ibom States
We use the duration (in years) of schooling, or 
formal education, from the basic primary school, 
through secondary schools to the tertiary educa-
tional institutions, as a schedule for our projec-
tion. Recently, the Federal Ministry of Education 
has approved the duration of education in Nige-
ria to be six years of basic primary school; three 
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years of junior secondary schooling; three years 
of senior secondary schooling, and four years of 
ordinary (i.e. non-professional) university edu-
cation. This programme has become popularly 
known as the 6-3-3-4 system of education. While it 
takes longer than four years of tertiary education 
for students to graduate in the professional areas, 
we prefer to keep our projection simple by using 
the 6-3-3-4 system, which makes a total of 16 years 
to produce a graduate of tertiary educational in-
stitutions in Nigeria. Therefore, we fix the point 
at which a radical inequality in educational attain-
ment will appear between Akwa Ibom and Cross 
River States at 16 years into the future, using the 
year of the promulgation of the free education pol-
icy in Akwa Ibom State, i.e. 2008, as the base year 
from which the projection starts.
Thus, by the year 2024, a substantial propor-
tion of children who were of school-going age 
in Akwa Ibom State from 2008 onwards would 
have achieved higher levels of educational attain-
ment than their counterparts in Cross River State. 
By the year 2015, Akwa Ibom State will have 
achieved the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) pertaining to basic (primary) education, 
while Cross River State may not have achieved 
the MDGs, or if it does, it will have done so to 
a lower degree than the outcomes facilitated by 
the free education policy of Akwa Ibom State. 
The higher educational attainment in Akwa Ibom 
State is likely to be similar for all three levels of 
education because of the growing number of var-
ious kinds of tertiary and secondary educational 
institutions in the state. For example, the Akwa 
Ibom State University of Science and Technolo-
gy and other tertiary institutions, such as those 
training in petroleum oil engineering and tech-
nology, as well as several other polytechnical and 
monotechnical schools, appeared in the past few 
years of the Fourth Republic (1999–2011).
Additionally, the Akwa Ibom government 
has put in place several financial assistance pro-
grammes, such as scholarships, bursaries, grants 
and so forth, to support students of the state’s 
origin in tertiary (undergraduate and postgrad-
uate) educational systems. This will ensure that 
the inequality in human capital levels will be po-
larised in favour of Akwa Ibom State.
9.3. Persisting inequality in regional 
educational attainment in Nigeria: 
Evidence from comparing the South-
Western region’s free education policy 
against the rest of the country
Recently, Ingwe et al. (2011) confirmed the 
previous finding that the Yoruba inhabiting six 
Table 1. Educational characteristics of Cross River State and Akwa Ibom State.
No. Characteristic Cross River State Akwa Ibom State
1 Total net attendance rate of children of primary-school entry 
age attending primary or secondary school, and number of 
children of primary-school entry-age (in brackets) (2007)
95.0 (518) 92.1 (613)
2 Rate of primary school completion and transition to second-
ary education, and number of children who were in the last 
grade of primary school the previous year (in brackets) (2007)
100.00 (90) 87.1 (102)
3 Percentage of children of primary-school entry age currently 
attending grade 1 (2007) 
55.8 61.1 (higher/better)
4 Adult literacy rate (2006) 75.5 (higher/better) 67.0
5 Primary-school net enrolment (2006) 77.0 77.4 (higher/better)
6 Total net attendance rate of children of secondary-school age 
attending primary school (2007)
15.7 (higher) 9.0 (better)
7 Children of primary-school age attending primary or second-
ary school (2007)
95.0 (higher/better) 92.1
8 Total net attendance rate of children of secondary-school age 
attending secondary/higher school (2007)
70.7 (higher/better) 69.5
9 Level of literacy among women aged 15–24 years (2006) 78.7 (higher/better) 77.8
10 Youth literacy (age 15–24, 2006) 90.7 (higher/better) 83.7
11 Secondary-school net enrolment (2006) 62.4 (higher/better) 45.0
Source: the authors’ compilation from several issues of Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), over several years (2005, 2006, 2007a, b).
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states in south-western Nigeria (Ekiti, Lagos, 
Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo) possessed the 
highest number of tertiary educational institu-
tions and perhaps the highest level of education-
al attainment in Nigeria compared with other 
numerous ethno-cultural groups constituting the 
country’s remaining 30 states. This feat is attrib-
uted to the free education policy implemented by 
Obafemi Awolowo, former Premier of the region 
in the 1950s and political leader up to the 1980s. 
While the Yoruba are generally rated to be the 
best educated, it is less clear regarding the wide 
acknowledgement of the Ekiti as being on top 
of the education sector within the Yoruba land, 
with the highest number of their academic pro-
fessors compared with other Yoruba states and, 
of course, the rest of Nigeria. Therefore, it is in-
dubitable that free education policy translates 
into higher educational attainment at various 
levels, from basic (primary) to tertiary (Ingwe et 
al. 2011, Fafunwa 1967, 2004).
10. Discriminatory oil revenue 
allocation and deepening inequality 
in human capital development in 
Akwa Ibom and Cross River States
The declaration of a free education policy 
by the government of Akwa Ibom State in 2008 
provides a good basis for simulating and pro-
jecting the inequality that will emerge between 
Akwa Ibom State and its neighbour, Cross Riv-
er State. The former’s policy of free education is 
suitable for making the simulation for several 
reasons, a few of which will be stated here. The 
policy mandates all parents to ensure that their 
children and wards take advantage of the op-
portunity that the Akwa Ibom State government 
has provided for the children and youth of the 
state to acquire free and compulsory education. 
This policy is facilitated by the disproportionate-
ly higher allocation to Akwa Ibom State of about 
₦14 billion monthly of the 13% share, according 
to the oil derivation principle, due to the belief 
that its offshore territory contains oil resources 
commensurate to that share, while Cross Riv-
er State received only ₦1.5 billion for its oil re-
sources – a difference of ₦12.5 billion. The more 
recent striking of Cross River State from the list 
of offshore oil-producing areas or littoral states in 
March 2009, despite its vast onshore petroleum 
oil resources included by the federal government 
in the national oil reserve classification, is bound 
to worsen the budgetary capacity of Cross River 
State and at least create difficulties in adopting 
its own free education policy of the kind imple-
mented in Akwa Ibom State. However, the pro-
priety or otherwise of these revenue-sharing con-
siderations is secondary in this paper, attention 
being concentrated upon the inequality in future 
educational or human capital development out-
comes in the two states.
10.1. Cross River State’s dwindling revenue 
and Nigeria’s federal government 
marginalisation
Information about the striking of Cross River 
State from the list of Nigeria’s littoral areas, i.e. 
those with ocean-ward boundaries qualifying 
them for receipt of the 13% share of the revenue 
accruing from crude oil export, highlights the 
prominence of two major agencies of the federal 
government of Nigeria in the decision of March 
2009. Those are the National Boundary Commis-
sion (NBC) and the Revenue Mobilisation and 
Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). They informed 
the public, including stakeholders, the Account-
ant-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
as well as the governments and peoples of Akwa 
Ibom and Cross River States, that in January 
2009 Cross River ceased to be a littoral state and 
so forfeited its monthly 13% share based on oil 
resources exploitation from Nigeria’s offshore 
territory. This letter contradicted the NBC’s let-
ter (Reference No: NBC/SEC32/1/485) of 4 Jan-
uary 2005 reporting that, following its delinea-
tion of the maritime boundary between the two 
states, “Cross River State will gain 76 oil wells”. 
The government of Cross River State sued the 
NBC, RMAFC and its parties, seeking to restrain 
them from “enforcing or acting upon any other 
maritime or estuarine boundary alleged to exist 
between the two states, except that determined 
by the NBC in 2005 and accepted by the parties, 
which had been in use for revenue sharing pur-
poses for several years, pending the determina-
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tion of the substantive suit” (Adekeye et al. 2009: 
38).
An earlier action of the federal government 
that smacks of the marginalisation of Cross River 
State was the rather easy concession of part of 
the state’s territory (the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsu-
la) to the Cameroon Republic in 2005 ignoring 
the Efik people, a socio-cultural group whose 
traditional kingdom originally owns and ad-
ministers the Bakassi region, who consider the 
presentation made by the federal government 
at The Hague considering the Efik ownership of 
and entitlement to the Bakassi area to be weak 
and not strong enough. The Efik and Cross Riv-
er people argued that Nigeria’s federal govern-
ment was wrong in delegating persons ignorant 
of the Bakassi region’s history, geography, soci-
ology, anthropology and politics, or knowledge 
required for providing stronger evidence to The 
Hague-based World Court of Justice in The Neth-
erlands, instead of the Efik custodians and own-
ers of the Bakassi Peninsula. Moreover, they ar-
gued that the British government which claimed 
to have conceded Bakassi to the Germans dur-
ing the heydays of colonialism did so wrongly, 
because Bakassi was not part of the British ter-
ritory during colonialism as they claimed. The 
World Court judgement, according to the people 
of Cross River State and the Efik, was delivered 
without hearing appeals on these and related 
points in issues well known in Cross River State. 
Additionally, while the delegation of Nigeria’s 
federal government to the World Court had 
more delegates who were interested in winning 
some territories currently in north-eastern Nige-
ria from Cameroon, the Efik historians, geogra-
phers, sociologists, politicians, anthropologists 
etc. could also have provided ample evidence of 
the ownership of Bakassi by Cross River State, 
but were marginalised and the strength of the 
representation weakened in terms of the number 
of representatives, resources and opportunities 
for preparing evidence. Therefore, the attempt to 
seize 76 oil wells from Cross River State for the 
benefit of Akwa Ibom State stimulated moves by 
Cross River State to appeal against the Bakassi 
ceding to Cameroon (The Village Square, a dis-
cussion programme broadcast by the Cross Riv-
er Broadcasting Corporation Television between 
May and June 2009).
The panel contributors to the publicly tele-
vised focus group serial discussion perceived the 
decisions of the Nigerian Boundary Commission 
as inappropriate for the following reasons. First, 
the NBC’s ceding of the 76 oil wells hitherto be-
longing to Cross River State and being an impor-
tant criterion in attracting oil revenue, to Akwa 
Ibom State disproportionately increased the lat-
ter’s number of oil wells and revenue. Second, in 
taking this action, the NBC preferred to ignore 
that Cross River State still possessed an ocean-
ward boundary in its southern extreme, but 
claimed that it was not one of Nigeria’s littoral 
states. Third, the NBC failed to await Nigeria’s 
Supreme Court restraint placed on the NBC’s 
move to re-delineate the maritime and estuarine 
boundaries between the two states. Fourth, the 
NBC also failed to await the ruling of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (in The Hague) on the 
matter of ceding the Bakassi Peninsula (part 
of Cross River State) to Cameroon (The Village 
Square 2009).
10.2. Cross River State government’s 
response to federal marginalisation
A major strategy to diversify the economy of 
Cross River State from sole dependence on the 
federal government’s oil-derived revenue, statu-
torily shared among all federal states of Nigeria, 
has been through tourism sector development. 
When this strategy was initiated in the 2000s, it 
did not officially anticipate the recent twists in-
volving the removal of Cross River State from the 
list of the few oil-producing states in the Niger 
Delta, but the emphasis on tourism development 
increased after the implementation of the poli-
cy of the state’s marginalisation. Some evidence 
can be found in the several speeches made by 
the State Governor, Senator Liyel Imoke, who 
has consistently urged the State’s Cabinet (Exec-
utive Council), citizens, friends and supporters 
to identify and harness other alternative sourc-
es of revenue to fund development programmes 
in the face of the stoppage of federal allocations 
from oil-derived funds. In this connection, tourist 
products developed by Cross River State attract 
the attention and patronage of the African re-
gional and global community. This is especially 
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true of two out of the State’s many tourist pro-
jects. One is the phenomenally successful annual 
31-day long Calabar Festival, fondly described 
as Africa’s Largest Street Party, hosted by the 
Cross River State Tourism Commission in the 
capital and a free-trade zone city, Calabar. The 
other is the creation in the Adiabo community 
in the Odukpani local government area within 
the outskirts of Calabar city of the TINAPA Lei-
sure and Business Resort, complete with shop-
ping and recreational complexes, including film 
production studios, emporia and a hotel, that 
make it comparable to Dubai’s trade complexes 
(Treasure Magazine International 2013, Andrew & 
Ekpenyong 2012). However, the size and compa-
rability of the revenue earned from tourism with 
the State’s previous earnings from federal oil-de-
rived coffers is still poorly known.
11. Conclusion and recommendations
The above discussion has highlighted issues 
bordering on marginalisation of Cross River 
State by the institutions of the federal govern-
ment of Nigeria, mainly the National Bounda-
ry Commission, the Revenue Mobilisation and 
Fiscal Commission, the Accountant-General of 
Nigeria’s federation, the Ministry of Justice, and 
others. It has been shown that, strengthened by 
the benefits of the ceding of the Bakassi Peninsu-
la and more recently 76 oil wells in offshore Ni-
geria, Akwa Ibom State government has under-
taken an ambitious free education policy which 
ensures that basic primary education is free and 
compulsory for the children and youths of the 
state. Since Cross River State has been a victim 
of what is turning out to be systematic margin-
alisation, its government cannot bear the cost of 
undertaking a free education policy of the kind 
adopted by its neighbour. The attempt to seize 
Cross River State’s 76 oil wells represents an ef-
fort to consolidate the existing marginalisation, 
which includes a greater degree of educational 
disadvantage in Cross River State than in Akwa 
Ibom State. We have highlighted the consequenc-
es of the ongoing marginalisation in terms of the 
future inequality in human capital in 2014 when 
the first batch of pupils have graduated from pri-
mary school under the free education policy of 
Akwa Ibom State. This will ensure that the state 
achieves its MDG regarding universal basic edu-
cation by 2015, and by extension, by 2024, when 
children who pioneered the free education policy 
would have graduated from 4-year tertiary ed-
ucational institutions. When these dates come, 
Cross River State people and youths will conspic-
uously lag behind their counterparts in Akwa 
Ibom State.
Considering the serious consequences of the 
ongoing and past marginalisation of Cross River 
State, we recommend that:
1. The Cross River State people and civil soci-
ety should embark on serious monitoring of 
all acts that smack of marginalisation by any 
entity whatsoever as a way of creating pro-
grammes designed to counteract it, to make it 
visible to the federal government and relevant 
entities capable of redressing the injustice.
2. The federal government of Nigeria should be 
compelled by Cross River State people and 
civil society to refrain from further acts of 
marginalisation.
3. The government of Cross River State should 
undertake creative educational advancement 
programmes as a way of addressing the wide 
inequality in human capital attainment and, 
by extension, the lower competitiveness of 
Cross River citizens by 2014 and 2024, and 
henceforth. We recommend that creativity can 
lead to the management (after careful plan-
ning) of cost-effective educational and human 
capital development programmes for Cross 
River State people.
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